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ARTICLES

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, OVERINDEBTEDNESS &
COMPARATIVE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: SEARCHING
FOR CAUSES AND EVALUATING SOLUTIONS
JasonJ. Kilborn*
Which do you believe are more common in English: words ending in
"-ing" or words in which the next-to-last letter is "n"? How about words
beginning with the letter "r" or words in which the letter "r" is the third letter?
If you are like most people,1 you responded that "-ing" words and those that
begin with "r" are more common-although the other answer is correct for
both questions. 2 Scientists who study behavior, particularly decision making,
propose that people systematically and consistently tend to answer these types
of questions incorrectly
because they are relying on a mental shortcut called
"availability.", 3 That is, since it is easier for people to recall words that end in
"-ing" or begin with "r," they erroneously conclude such words are more
common than words in which "n"is the second to last letter4 or words in which
the third letter is "r."Difficult probabilistic questions like these are so taxing
that human minds develop short cuts-or "heuristics"-to ease the task. 5
These shortcuts are fine when the questions are relatively inconsequential.
These shortcuts, however, raise cause for concern with weightier questions.
Take for example the following: Do you believe that you are more or less
likely than the average person to be victimized by crime, stricken with a
.

Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I offer my heartfelt thanks to Tel-

Aviv University's Cegla Center for inviting me to present this paper at its fantastic conference on "Personal
Bankruptcy in the 21st Century: Emerging Trends and New Challenges."
1 Of course, by "people," I mean people who speak English. I suspect that examples could be offered of
similar "mind tricks" in other languages, however, because the heuristic described seems inherent to human

cognition.
2 These examples and their behavioral implications are described in Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 663 & n. 141

(1999).
3 See id.
4 Notice this cannot be true, because all words ending in "-ing" also fall into this category.
5 See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2.
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serious disease, involuntarily unemployed, or injured in a car accident? In
behavioral experiments, more people than logically possible generally suggest
they are less likely than the average person to suffer from such negative
events. 6 Behavioral scientists ascribe this systematic underestimation of the

probability of negative events to self-serving biases of overconfidence present
in most individuals. 7 These and many other behavioral findings underlie a8
modified form of economic analysis of law called "behavioral economics."
This new analytical approach holds exciting predictive and prescriptive

potential in a wide range of areas, particularly in fields involving economic
risk analysis and behavior modification-such as consumer debt and
bankruptcy.
A consensus seems to be developing among societies in Western Europe

and in the United States, among others, on the desirability of consumer credit
and the resulting necessity of treating the social ills associated with excessive
consumer debt. More and more, consumer credit has come to be regarded

positively as empowering consumers to make better lives for themselves by
leveraging future earning potential. If consumer credit is no longer restricted,
it is not possible to eliminate overindebtedness and the social problems it

causes. Consumers find themselves financially overextended both as a result
of their own poor planning and as a result of external factors, such as job loss,

medical problems, and divorce. 9 Thus, more and more countries seem to have
agreed on the general notion that "overindebtedness" should be prevented to

the extent possible. 10 But if overindebtedness cannot be prevented, it should at
least be treated.

Western society seems largely to have abandoned ex ante

6 See, e.g., id. at 656.
7 See, e.g., id.
8 See, e.g., id.
9 See generally, TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 178 (1989).
10 For a discussion of some of these new systems, see CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(Johanna Niemi-Kiesildinen et al.
eds., 2003). See also Jason Kilbom, Continuity, Change, and Innovation in
Emerging Consumer Bankruptcy Systems: Belgium and Luxembourg, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
[hereinafter Kilbom, Belgium & Luxembourg] (forthcoming 2006); Jason Kilbom, The Hidden Life of
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for the New U.S. Law from Unexpected Parallels in the
Netherlands, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 2006); Jason Kilborn, The Innovative German
Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the
United States, 24 Nw. J.INT'L LAW & Bus. 257 (2004) [hereinafter Kilbom, German Approach]; Jason
Kilbom, La Responsabilisation de I'Economie: What the United States Can Learn from the New French Law
on Consumer Overindebtedness,26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 619 (2005) [hereinafter Kilbom, French Law]; Johanna
Niemi-Kiesilaiinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure a Market Failure or a Social
Problem?, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J.473 (1999) [hereinafter Niemi-Kiesildinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in
Comparison].
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restriction of the supply of consumer credit in favor of ex post treatment of the
problems of overindebtedness through legal consumer debt relief."
The question today is whether a consumer debt relief system can help in
preventing excessive consumer borrowing, and if so, which types of systems
are best suited to changing
• • incentives 12and inculcating responsible borrowing
habits. In Part 1, 1 join commentators in arguing behavioral economics can
explain some of the reasons why consumers get themselves into trouble despite
the obvious dangers of borrowing and overspending.' 3 I therefore propose in
Part II that we should look to behavioral economics to assess whether the
consumer bankruptcy system might affect incentives and attitudes to reduce
overindebtedness problems before they arise. 14 This Part concludes legal
regulation appears virtually powerless to affect the demand side of the
consumer credit equation. To the limited extent consumer bankruptcy might
reduce overly risky borrowing, I argue in Part III that behavioral economics
indicates some models of consumer debt relief are likely to be more effective
than others in achieving this goal.15 Part IV applies several behavioral insights
6
to a number of emerging consumer debt relief systems in Continental Europe.'
It suggests aspects of certain systems are better ,suited than others for educating
debtors on personal responsibility and inculcating payment morality-the
stated goals of these new systems.
To be completely clear at the outset, I do not intend to advance "strong"
conclusions about consumer bankruptcy based on behavioral economics in this17
Article. For one thing, it is not entirely clear the results of behavioral studies
conducted on U.S. subjects would produce similar results if conducted on
Western Europeans-much less members of other cultures. I strongly believe,
however, the behavioral patterns discussed in this Article are, if not universal,
at least shared to a significant degree. Thus, I offer for further consideration
what I consider to be compelling insights from behavioral economics on the
potential role of consumer bankruptcy in preventing and treating the problems

11 See Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1068-69 (2004).
12 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
13 See infra Part i.
14 See infra Part H.
5 See infra Part I.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 Due to space constraints, I will not analyze the many fascinating experiments that led to the behavioral
conclusions discussed here. I will, however, cite sources that describe these experiments in some detail.
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associated with consumer overindebtedness-virtually wherever in the world
they might arise.
I.

THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF "ExCESSIVE" CONSUMER BORROWING

The United States and Europe set out slowly on the path to consumer
overindebtedness in the early 1900s with the rise of installment selling. Lendol
Calder's description of the U.S. credit system at the turn of the twentieth
century applies in like manner to Europe: "people who had money could easily
'8
borrow more, while people without money found it difficult to borrow at all."'
In the first quarter of the 1900s, though, an overhaul of usury laws and the rise
of installment selling of consumer goods made "consumer credit" an
19
acceptable concept economically and eventually socially in the United States.
In Europe, consumer credit restrictions slowed the tide of consumer lending
that rose in the United States after World War 11.20
The pace of consumer credit expansion accelerated explosively in the late
1970s and early 1980s with the "democratization" of credit in both Europe and
the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court all but abolished effective
regulation of consumer lending with its 1978 decision in Marquette National
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.21 European states
followed suit as parliaments "liberalized" consumer credit regulations in the
1980s. 22 Consumers were now left largely to their own devices in choosing
whether and to what extent to take on debt. Opening up the consumer credit
market introduced a frenzy of competition among the purveyors of this highly
profitable "product., 23 Intense competitive pressures forced lenders to
advertise and structure their products in a manner that would take advantage
(consciously or unconsciously) of powerful competitive
forces-the
4
psychological biases and weaknesses of their customers.2

18

LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT

124 (1999); see also, e.g., Herv6 Jaouen, Quelques transformations d'attitude et de pratiques chez les
banquiersde 1965 a 1995, in LE SURENDETrEMENT DES PARTICULIERS 213-16 (Michel Gardaz ed., 1997).
19 See CALDER, supra note 18, at 124-203.
20 See, e.g., Niemi-Kiesildinen, ConsumerBankruptcy in Comparison,supra note 10, at 480.

21 439 U.S. 299 (1978); see also Braucher, supra note 11, at 1074.
22 See, e.g., Niemi-Kiesildinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison, supra note 10, at 480-82.
23 See, e.g., David A. Lander, "It 'is' the Best of Times, It 'is' the Worst of Times": A Short Essay on
Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BAN KR. L.J. 201, 202 (2004).
24 See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 12, at 1373.
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Just as lawmakers were throwing consumers into the shark-infested ocean
of new borrowing opportunities, cognitive psychologists and behavioral
researchers were uncovering systematic hindrances to consumers' attempts to
swim in this ocean.25 These behavioral scientists revealed compelling
evidence of cognitive illusions ("biases") and mental shortcuts ("heuristics")
that systematically and predictably skew individuals' analysis of probabilities,
choices, and behavior in ways inconsistent with logic and welfare
maximization.2 6

The behavioralists do not claim people act "irrationally," but rather people
act in ways that systematically and predictably diverge from the "rational
choice" model of traditional economic analysis. 27 People thus inadvertently
fail to maximize their own future utility not because they are irrational, but

because their rationality is "bounded" by documented and consistent biases
and mental shortcuts. These "bounds" of rationality affect behavior in a
variety of contexts, particularly contexts involving many complex variables

and ambiguous, unpredictable consequences of any given choice-like
consumer borrowing.
Scholars in a variety of legal areas have rushed to this new analytical
vehicle to explain or support their predictions and prescriptions. 29 Thomas

Jackson's landmark analysis of bankruptcy policy led the. way in behavioral
economic analysis of bankruptcy law. 30 Very little work since then has applied

behavioral economic insights to consumer overindebtedness and consumer
bankruptcy. 3'

But then the discipline is quite new.

As one behavioralist

scholar observed
in 1998, "[w]e are at the beginning of behavioral law and
32
economics.'

25 See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1501 (1998) (dating the beginning of the new
discipline of "behavioral decision theory" to the late 1970s and early 1980s).
26 For two seminal pieces in this burgeoning field, see Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, and Christine Jolls
et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
27 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2; Jolls et al., supra note 26.
28 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1076-84 (2000).
29 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1501.
30 See generally THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); Thomas H.
Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985).
31 But see Saul Schwartz's excellent discussion in Personal Bankruptcy Law: A Behavioral Perspective,
in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 61, 62-67 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesildinen et al. eds., 2003);
see also Bar-Gill, supra note 12.
32 Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Painsof Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1747
(1998).
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Behavioral economics offers compelling insights into the tendency of
consumers to accumulate "too much" debt when freed from the constraints of
legal credit restrictions. Many behavioral insights are not particularly relevant
to an analysis of consumer overindebtedness and its "treatment," however,
several are astonishingly apt. For example, behavioral findings suggest
consumers suffer from consistent overconfidence, they systematically gauge
risk inaccurately based on information readily "available" to them from
memory, and they succumb to "bounded willpower" by severely
underestimating future costs and overvaluing present benefits. 33 Thus,
behavioral economics offers compelling explanations for why consumers so
often underestimate the possibility they will be unable to meet their future
credit obligations with future income and why they so often fall prey to the
powerful siren song of present benefits while all but ignoring future costs. If
the supply side of consumer credit is unconstrained, behavioral economics
reveals powerful forces render control of the demand side virtually impossible.
A. The Overconfidence Bias
Individuals tend to be overly optimistic and overconfident regarding their
own susceptibility to risk.34 Specifically, people systematically underestimate
their own chances of suffering an adverse event, even if they understand
perfectly well or even overstate the probability of others suffering the same
fate ("It can't happen to me.").35 People of all social categories are prone to
overconfidence in their own judgment and susceptibility to risk, even those
who are more informed about the actual statistical probability of adverse
events. 36 This overconfidence bias is exacerbated by the "illusion of control,"
which leads individuals to overestimate their ability to avoid negative events
by controlling
their own behavior ("I'll never have a car accident-I'm a good
37
driver.").

The overconfidence bias figures prominently in the history of consumer
credit in the United States. Lendol Calder explains, as U.S. consumers after
World War II took on more and more debt, "liv[ing] beyond their income but
not beyond their credit," they palliated their anxiety with "the optimistic
conviction that. . . 'we'll make it somehow. Things will always be better33 See infra Part L.A-C.
34 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 654-62.
35 See, e.g., id.
36 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CH. L. REv. 1175, 1188-89 (1997).
37 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 658-59; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1092.
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maybe a lot better. ' ' 38 Robert Manning suggests optimistic economic
projections by the Reagan and Bush administrations led many consumers to
use more and more credit to achieve lifestyles commensurate with better days
that surely lay ahead. 39 "It can't happen to me" overconfidence bias eventually
led more and more consumers to underestimate the likelihood they would fall
victim to a simple mismatch between present borrowing and future income or
to an unexpected liquidity crisis. 4 0 Moreover, laboring under the illusion of
control, consumers budgeted-some more carefully than others-enhancing
their feeling of control over their financial futures and invincibility to future
financial crisis. 4' Given the complexities of interest rate calculations and the
vagaries of a family budget, it is not difficult to see how overconfidence has
lured many a consumer too close to the edge of financial stability. Real
"control" over our financial futures is elusive, indeed, and much more so for
some than for others.
B. The Availability Heuristic
In studying how individuals use mental shortcuts to simplify predictions of
the likelihood of future events-particularly negative events-'"researchers
have uncovered a veritable fool's gold mine of nonrational cognitive
,42
For example, researchers have shown individuals most often
anomalies."
tend to assess the likelihood of a future event based on how easily similar
event is.43
events can be recalled, in other words, how "available" such an
Three factors especially influence the "availability" of a negative event:
frequency, recency, and salience."a If a person has witnessed an event (or
reports of an event) frequently or recently-such as recent media coverage of
airplane or car accidents-that person will tend to overestimate the likelihood
of a similar accident occurring in the future.4 5 And if a person witnesses one
particularly salient occurrence of a negative event-such as a particularly
violent crash or a nuclear catastrophe-that vivid image will form a readily
38 CALDER, supra note 18, at 297.
39 See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S ADDICTION TO

CREDIT 64-65 (2000) (noting credit card debt as a percentage of disposable income rose from 65.4% in 1980
to83.5% in 1990).
40 For an intriguing counterargument that overconfidence might cause consumers to borrow too little see
Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 127, 145-57 (2004).
41 See, e.g., CALDER, supra note 18, at 297.
42 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 662; see id. at 662-69.
43 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2,at 662-64; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1477, 1518-19.
44 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 662-64; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1477, 1518-19.
45 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 662-64; Jolls
et al., supra note 26, at 1477, 1518-19.
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"available" basis for overestimation of the risk of similar incidents in the
future.4 6

The converse is also true. That is, if instances of a negative event are
infrequent or distant, or if a negative event or the factors that led to it are not
salient, people will underestimate the likelihood of a similar future negative

event.47 For example, people discount the likelihood of cancer or lung disease
because the risk of one cigarette at a time lacks salience. Indeed, given the
underlying effects of the overconfidence bias, one would expect individuals to
underestimate considerably the risk of negative events that are not "available."
For most consumers, serious incidents of overindebtedness lack
"availability," so consumers understandably underestimate the risk of their
own overborrowing.

If consumers have not been exposed frequently or

recently to a liquidity crisis or other potential financial problem, they are likely
to underestimate the possibility of such a problem in the future. Even if
consumers are bombarded with statistics about default rates and levels of

bankruptcies among others, the sheer number and dry, impersonal nature of
these statistics might rob them of salience. Just as people discount the
likelihood of cancer or lung disease because the risk of one cigarette at a time
lacks salience, consumers understandably discount the risks of small,

incremental borrowing (especially using credit cards) leading to big financial
trouble.4 8
Indeed, even if a default or other financial crisis has struck the consumer
personally, the powerful overconfidence bias might well overcome even
"available" negative events, leading consumers to distinguish and discount
distant past negative events from future similar risks-after all, "it can't

46 1 believe the availability heuristic played an important role in the development of federal bankruptcy
relief in the United States because our first national bankruptcy bill passed only after great numbers of
particularly prominent debtors were imprisoned following the collapse of huge speculation schemes in the
1790s. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY INTHE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
114-16, 177, 180, 191-94, 203-04 (2002). Similarly, I believe the availability heuristic contributed
significantly to the development of European consumer bankruptcy relief in the 1990s as consumers more and
more frequently experienced financial distress due to financial overextension. Obviously, many factors were
in play in both systems at both times, but the role of the availability heuristic in influencing legislation-at
least its timing-can hardly be gainsaid. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1518-22 (suggesting
environmental legislation is driven in part by media coverage of low-probability and otherwise low-profile
risks).
47 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 662-64; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1477, 1518-19.
48 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9 (observing "[diebtors who never dream of seeking a $5,000 bank
loan might run up $5,000 in charges of $50 at a time").
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happen to me." Combining a lack of availability-particularly salience-with
the overconfidence bias leads consumers to underestimate substantially
financial risk. 49 The bias toward overconsumption of credit plagues consumers
coming and going.
C. Hyperbolic Discountingand Bounded Willpower
Confirming something most of us have witnessed in ourselves and others,
behavioralists have amassed evidence that individuals systematically overvalue
immediate benefits and costs and undervalue delayed benefits and costs.50 In
particular, present gratification tends to be highly overvalued, and future costs
tend to be even more heavily discounted. I To use the scholarly jargon,
individuals apply "hyperbolic discounting" to downplay future costs even more
powerfully than future benefits as the costs and benefits move farther and
farther into the future. 52 Ultimately, even if a cost might outweigh a benefit in
the present, as that cost extends further into the future, the "hyperbolically"
discounted perception of that future cost might ultimately fall below the less
discounted perception of the future value of the benefit, thus reversing the
balance between costs
and benefits-and the ultimate decision whether to take
53
a risk-over time.
A closely related problem is the tendency of individuals to suffer from
"bounded willpower." 54 People often minimize the benefits and acknowledge
the costs of risky future activity (e.g., smoking or eating fatty foods) and may
decide to avoid such behavior while its benefits lie in the future.55 But once
the "moment of truth" arrives, the immediate (and now overvalued) present
benefit of the risky activity outweighs the still distant (and still heavily
discounted) future costs. 56 In many cases, this skewing of the relative weights
of costs and benefits results in weakening or abandonment of the earlier
57
willpower to forego that risky activity.
49 See Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1541-42.
50 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 678-80; Sunstein, supra note 36, at 1193-94.
51 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1539; Robert H. Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With
and Without Regret, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 13, 16-18 (Francesco Parisi &
Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
52 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1539; Frank, supra note 51.
53 For a wonderful explanation of this effect, see Bar-Gill, supra note 12, at 1396-98.
54 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1479, 1523.
15 See id.
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., id. (noting "bounded willpower" undergirds Thomas Jackson's theory of the discharge and
non-waivable exemption policies in consumer bankruptcy).
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The effects of bounded willpower and hyperbolic discounting are
especially pronounced in the average consumer credit transaction, particularly
those involving revolving credit sources like credit cards. Consumer credit
facilitates, indeed, enhances consumers' susceptibility to the bias toward
present consumption and against delayed gratification. Hyperbolic discounting
explains (at least in part) why consumers can only be expected to overvalue the
benefits of "buying now" while downplaying the costs of "paying later."
Even if a consumer understands the potential costs of present borrowing in
excess of certain future income, when the time comes to choose whether to buy
a thing on credit or save for later, hyperbolic discounting pushes the decision
powerfully in favor of borrowing. The overvalued present benefit of having
the thing can be expected to outweigh the heavily discounted future benefit of
having the thing unencumbered by debt. And the overemphasized present cost
of foregoing present consumption can be expected to outweigh the discounted
future cost of paying back the loan (or the discounted future risk of being
unable to do so). Even if the objective future costs and risk of default
accurately gauged might outweigh the present benefit, hyperbolic discounting
skews this decision-making process and blinds the consumer decision-maker to
this negative reality.
It turns out that the urge for instant gratification is not a character flaw of
"Generation X," but a deep-seated psychological phenomenon that affects
most consumers. While the bias toward present consumption and against
delayed gratification is not a shocking discovery, behavioralists offer scientific
evidence that human nature-not individual "prodigality"-underlies this bias.
Before credit was widely available to consumers, these biases remained
largely in the shadows. Now that credit has been "democratized," consumers
are diving into the water, confident of their ability to swim, but not knowing
that millstones hang from their necks. Social and economic Darwinism offers
no acceptable answer to this problem. Unlike in the business world, "market
corrections" cannot destroy consumers who suffer more from these biases,
leaving only those strong enough to resist. Society cannot allow the weak to
be devoured in the new economic jungle-at least Western societies have
signaled their unwillingness to do so. The question is how to deal with the
epidemic of overindebtedness caused in part by these biases.
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II.

OVERINDEBTEDNESS LIKELY CANNOT BE PREVENTED BY

DEMAND-SIDE EFFORTS

If behavioral economics offers compelling explanations for the causes of
over-borrowing, then behavioral economics should be consulted for directly
countervailing potential solutions to the problem. It turns out that these biases
are exceedingly difficult to overcome, perhaps so much so that we ought to
abandon thoughts of curing overindebtedness and focus on treating its
inevitable effects.
The revelations of behavioral economics not only suggest consumers labor
under a variety of powerful biases, but "debiasing" is difficult if not
impossible. 58
Behaviors like the overconfidence bias and hyperbolic
discounting stubbornly persist even when people are made keenly aware of
59
such biasing forces and the actual probabilities of adverse events.
This suggests most if not all ex ante efforts at getting more information to
consumers about the risks of over-borrowing will do little to avoid consumer
overindebtedness. Information can help consumers only if they are able to use
it to gauge risk more accurately and avoid "too much" risk. But behavioralists
6
have shown people are often simply unable to benefit from more information. 0
Biases and heuristics influence behavior more powerfully than informationindeed, inaccurate predictions of risk persist even in the presence of accurate
statistics about risk.6'
Perhaps we ask too much of bankruptcy law if we expect it to change
overly risky consumer borrowing behaviors. Current "debtor education"
programs that focus on money-management skills seem more likely to
exacerbate the biases explored above. These programs enhance the illusion of
control that leads to overconfidence in future borrowing. 62 Indeed, behavioral
evidence strongly suggests inevitable failure awaits even debtor education that

58 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 654-58; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1071; see also
Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1527.
59 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 654-58; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1071; see also
Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1527.
60 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 654-58; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1071; see also
Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1527.
61 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 654-58; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1071;
see also
Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1527.
62 See supra notes 37-41.
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reveals these biases and focuses consumers on avoiding them. 63 Passive debtor
education on the ills of overborrowing is no match for the powerful
psychological forces driving overconfidence and over-enthusiasm for present
borrowing. To be sure, consumer financial education is valuable. 64 Behavioral
economics suggests, however, we ought not expect too much from passive
"debtor education" as a core part of consumer overindebtedness treatment.
Even "active" learning from negative experience resulting from
overborrowing is not likely to be particularly effective. Researchers suggest,
to be effective, "lessons" on the ills of these biases must be immediate and
unambiguous, particularly if the causal connection between the risk and the
adverse event is complex. 65 Thus, even if the consequences of overborrowing
are severe, consumers are exceedingly unlikely to learn from past mistakes
with overborrowing. The ills of overborrowing will, by definition, occur long
after biases and heuristics have driven a consumer to risky borrowing that
produces the ill effects. Such lessons will neither be immediately nor
unambiguously tied to the past risky behavior (indeed, they are more likely to
be attributed to intervening liquidity problems beyond the consumer's control).
Perhaps behavioral economics teaches us we simply must accept that backend relief from overindebtedness is the best we can manage. If front-end
restrictions on the supply side of consumer credit are judged inefficient or
politically inexpedient, perhaps we just have to accept that cognitive biases
will naturally lead to overconsumption of credit by many consumers.

63 Braucher suggests that some current U.S. programs implicitly attempt to address such biases. See
Braucher, supra note 11, at 1081 & n.93.

64 Additionally, framing the educational programs in certain ways might enhance their effects. Programs
might discourage risky borrowing more effectively by (1) framing lessons in terms of avoiding losses rather
than achieving benefits (to exploit loss aversion), (2) offering vivid and personal information on the risks of

excessive debt (to enhance availability), and (3) moving the focus away from the consumer's role in the credit
system and onto the powerful and dangerous tactics used by lenders in enticing overborrowing (avoiding
overconfidence). See Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1536-37. It appears, however, that most U.S. debtor
education programs are decidedly not focused on reducing consumer borrowing-perhaps not even overly
risky consumer borrowing. See Jean Braucher, Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: The Perspective of Interest
Analysis, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECrIvE 319 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et al. eds.,
2003).
65 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1765, 1783 (1998); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 691-92.
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III.

IF PREVENTION IS POSSIBLE, WHICH KIND OF BANKRUPTCY REGIME

WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE?

Whether we need formal consumer debt relief is a separate question that
Western society seems to be answering in the affirmative. Country after
country in Europe has joined the United States in recent years in offering more
66
or less generous relief to consumers unable to meet their credit obligations.
Now the question is what kind of relief system holds the most potential for not
only treating but also preventing the problems associated with
overindebtedness. If the biases discussed above can be overcome at the
margins, perhaps different types of bankruptcy relief might do so by turning
these biases to productive use.
Behavioral economics suggests some solutions have the potential to be
more effective than others in shifting incentives. 67 Since those who have fallen
into the traps of overindebtedness are now ending up in bankruptcy in many
countries, that process offers a concentrated source of consumer education for
discouraging overly risky borrowing-both by debtors and by others who hear
about the process from debtors or the press. Even if an uncontrollable
liquidity crisis leads to bankruptcy in most cases, if the relief process is not too
draconian, its structure might combat the biases that contribute to controllable
overborrowing and reinforce good attitudes about credit by debtors and nondebtors alike.
Apparently, little can be done about hyperbolic discounting, bounded
willpower, or the overconfidence bias 68-and we would not want to dampen
consumer confidence too much given how modem economies depend on
consumer borrowing and spending. The bankruptcy system might contribute
to making the risks of overborrowing marginally more "available," however,

66 See, e.g., Niemi-Kiesiliinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison, supra note 10, at 482-97.
67 To be sure, classical "law and economics" similarly suggests changing demands might affect debtor
behavior. For example, classical economic analysis of law also would observe that overly lenient systems
produce little incentive for consumers to control their debt burden ex ante, but overly demanding systems
might create a disincentive for consumers to cooperate with the system to produce returns for creditors ex post.
Behavioral economics reveals additional, primarily psychological effects of overly liberal and overly
demanding systems. The primary one is presented below; for example, consumers will more readily accept or
reject a system's lessons regarding payment morality depending upon the balance of costs and benefits. See
infra Part IV. Teaching lessons on personal responsibility and payment morality, rather than maximizing
economic incentives for efficient consumption, seems to be the focus of European consumer debt relief law, so
a behavioral economic analysis seems particularly enlightening here.
68

See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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by increasing the frequency,
recency, and salience of information about the
69
costs of overborrowing.
As for the debtors themselves, repeat filing rates are low even in the
extremely generous U.S. system, 70 so "re-educating" bankrupt debtors does not
seem to be of primary importance. On the other hand, since relatively few
cases of consumer bankruptcy result purely from excessive debt-as opposed
to a liquidity crisis like job loss, medical problems, or family interruption 7 1perhaps the small number of repeat filers are precisely that margin of filers on
whom credit "re-education" efforts should concentrate. It is impossible now to
know how effective or necessary re-education of debtors might be. But it is
worth considering the attitude-shifting affects the system might-or might
not-have on debtors who might be lured back into the trap of
overindebtedness.
The consumer bankruptcy system might also affect those not directly
involved in the system but who hear or see the messages it sends about the
dangers of excessive debt. If the risks of overborrowing can be made more
frequent, recent, or salient for potential debtors, that information might at the
margins influence the credit behavior of potential victims of
overindebtedness. 72 People talk about others' experiences in bankruptcy;
73
are
lawyer advertising, the news media, and government agencies
increasingly involved in disseminating information about consumer debt and
relief from excessive debt. Widely dispersed information about the nature of
the debt relief system might, therefore, have some effect on changing
behaviors among financially healthy consumers weighing the risks and benefits
of their credit options.
A. The "Get-Out-Of-Jail-Free"System in the United States
The quick in-and-out structure of most U.S. consumer bankruptcies seems
to offer little potential for increasing awareness of risk-either for debtors or
for those outside the system looking in. The overwhelming majority of
69
70

See supra Part 1.
See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 191-98 (reporting results of empirical study suggesting the

individual bankruptcy repeat rate in the United States is no higher than 8%, and perhaps as low as 34%).
71 See generally id.
72 See supra Part I.
73 For example, in Belgium, a special fund is used in part to finance dissemination of information on the
consumer debt relief system. See Law of 22 December 2003, art. 430, MONITEUR BELGE, 31 Dec. 2003, p.
62160, 62246.

HeinOnline -- 22 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 26 2005-2006

20051

SEARCHING FOR CAUSES AND EVALUATING SOLUTIONS

consumer bankruptcy cases in the United States pass through chapter 7 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.74 This system usually proceeds within three months
through three simple and largely ministerial steps: (1) the debtor's filing of a
petition for relief and detailed financial information, (2) the debtor's meeting
with a trustee to answer questions about the debtor's financial situation, and (3)
the trustee's filing of a report of "no available assets" and entry of a judgment
soon thereafter discharging the debtor from most unpaid debts.75
The
overwhelming majority of U.S. consumer debtors dedicate none of their future
income to paying their debts. 76 After filing and meeting with the trustee once,
they need not give another thought to the process that led them into and out of
overindebtedness.77
This system seems to ignore-indeed, perhaps even to aggravate-the
biases that lead many consumers down the path of danger. This quick and
minimalistic approach to debt relief does very little to increase the
"availability" of information about the potential risks and costs of
overborrowing-neither among debtors passing through the system nor among
those who hear about the system's operation second-hand. 78 To be sure,
forcing debtors to admit publicly their financial "failure" and subjecting them
to probing inquiry about their financial lives does increase the salience of
credit risks somewhat. I would not argue that no "stigma" attaches to
bankruptcy in the United States today. The ease and speed with which
ultimate relief arrives seems to rob the U.S. system of virtually any impact on
longer-term attitudes.
Even if information about financial distress is "frequent," given the
million-and-a-half annual consumer bankruptcy filings in recent years in the
United States,79 mere frequency most likely confirms to consumers that
effortless relief is available for the taking. Frequency without salience seems
to reduce availability, as when consumers underestimate the impact of
74 See Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics - Annual Filings, http://www.abiworld.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Annual U S Filings&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=62&
ContentlD=3256 (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). In my view this will remain true even under the law as recently
modified by the "means test."
75 For a general description of the U.S. bankruptcy system, see MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING
BANKRUrCY (1995).
76 See, e.g., id.
77 See, e.g., id.
78 See supra Part I.B.
79 Information on filing rates can be found on the website of the American Bankruptcy Institute, at
http://www.abiworld.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Online Resources/Bankruptcy-Statistics/
ABl-_.BankruptcyStatistics.htm.
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smoking, failing to exercise, or engaging in similar incrementally harmful
activities.
Indeed, if the information available to consumers is that the
system represents an easy way out of debt, that may well exacerbate
consumers' tendency to discount the potential future costs of risky credit
behavior. 8 1 After all, if future discharge is free for the taking, why worry about
the risks of present borrowing?
B. Emerging European Systems and Extended Payment Plans
The emerging European consumer debt relief systems seem to proceed in a
way that behavioral economics suggests offers much more potential to impact
consumer behavior. Each of these new systems begins much as the U.S.
system does, with a petition and schedules describing in great detail the
consumer's situation of financial collapse. 82 The new European systems
proceed in slightly different ways from that starting point; however, unlike the
U.S. system, they all eventually demand the great majority of debtors make at
83
least an attempt at repayment of debt from several years of future income.
As it turns out, in many cases, the debtor does not actually give up any future
income, or only gives up a small portion of it, 84 but every case requires the
for payment of all future income beyond a
debtor at least submit to a plan
85
threshold maximum amount.
The emerging European payment-system approach has greater potential
salutary effects on consumers' credit risk assessments, at least at the margins.
Requiring a payment plan in every case makes the costs of overindebtedness86
more salient in every case-at least a little, and perhaps significantly.
Indeed, when cases extend over several years (through the payment plan
period), that also increases the likelihood debtors and non-debtors will have
readily "available" exposure to a recent example of the risks and costs of
overborrowing. 87 The mental impact of a ninety-day in-and-out U.S. case is
fleeting even on the debtor, but it is much less likely that any given third party
will encounter an open case during this short period. The "debiasing" effect of
multi-year payment periods may be slight, and it may ultimately not be worth
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
See, e.g., Niemi-Kiesiliinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison, supra note 10, at 482-97.
See, e.g., Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 10, at 291-92.
See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
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the administrative cost, 88 but these European systems seem at least tacitly to be
addressing the biases that lead to overindebtedness-both among debtors and
among third-party observers.
The European-style payment-plan systems leverage the most powerful
form of learning available, maximizing educational potential, even if that
potential is never realized. Indeed, the Europeans seem to have focused more
on the educational aspect of this process-rather than on the economic return
to creditors-from the beginning. 89 At least for the debtors, these systems
require hands-on, active learning about the consequences, the costs, and the
responsibilities of overborrowing. 90 Submitting to several years of lost
revenue (or at least the potential for lost revenue) will likely stick much more
in the mind of a consumer reintroduced into the open credit economy. This is
debtor education in a very meaningful sense. Moreover, this active learning
might leverage the passive learning represented by credit counseling,
particularly if that counseling focuses in part on alerting debtors to the
behavioral biases that may have lured them into trouble. Ultimately, paymentplan systems send more constructive messages to potential consumer debtors
about the costs and responsibilities of credit.
IV. THE DELICATE BALANCE OF QUIDS AND QUOS:
THE "FAIRNESS" INSIGHT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

For what little impact the consumer bankruptcy system might have in
shifting general consumer attitudes about the risks of debt, it seems the
European-style payment-plan systems hold more potential for preventing
overindebtedness. Behavioral economics offers some further insights into
which of those widely varied systems has greaterpotential to affect behaviors
positively. I submit that debtor and non-debtor consumers might welcome and

88 The new Belgian system shows that the costs of this learning process can be visited on lenders. See
Law of 5 July 1998, art. 19, MONITEUR BELGE, 31 July 1998, p. 24613, 24621; Law of 19 April 2002, art. 2,
MONITEUR BELGE, 7 June 2002, p. 26229. One might impose costs on lenders not only as punishment for
having acted "irresponsibly," but also because they have consciously or unconsciously manipulated consumer
biases to achieve a profit. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 635, 721-43. Thus, it might well be fair

and sensible to ask lenders to dedicate a small part of their profits to pay for treatment of the victims of these
bias manipulations.
89 See Niemi-Kiesilginen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison, supra note 10, at 498.
90 It is, of course, a truism of learning theory that active learning by doing is superior to passive learning
by listening to lectures and the like. See, e.g., JAMES HARTLEY, LEARNING AND STUDYING: A RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVE 17 (Routledge 1998).
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learn from a payment-plan system, but only if they view it as being
administered "fairly."
Behavioral scientists have found not only do people exhibit "bounded
rationality" in their decision-making, they also exhibit "bounded self-interest"
in their interaction with others. 9 1 Contrary to traditional economic premises,
behavioralists have demonstrated people are not one-minded, selfish, valuemaximizers. 92 Instead, they want to be treated fairly and to treat others fairly,

even if that means sacrificing potential benefits or rejecting opportunities for
advancing self-interest. "Fair" in this context is generally not an indeterminate
concept. Fairness is a measure of how the situation coincides with or diverges
from what normally happens in such situations. 93 The closer a situation comes

to the "norm" (or at least what the individual views as the norm), the more
likely that situation is to be deemed "fair" and thus accepted as positive or
constructive.94
In societies with strong contract law-like those in the United States and

especially Europe-abiding by one's obligations is definitely "the norm." The
overwhelming majority of contractual obligations are honored in these
societies, they are strongly expected to be honored, and those who fail to honor
95
their obligations generally feel guilty about their failure to some degree.
Thus, most people can be expected to view paying their debts as "fair." At the
very least, most people can be expected to feel that making reasonable efforts
to pay off most types of debt is fair, and doing so or seeing others do so should

register positively. A system that allows debtors to evade their obligations
with little effort is likely to be viewed as unfair by most, even if it achieves
91 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1479, 1489-97;
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at 1755.
92 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1479, 1489-97;
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at 1755.
93 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1479, 1489-97;
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at 1755.
94 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1479, 1489-97;
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at 1755.
95 The legislative histories of the European consumer "bankruptcy" laws are replete with references to
the sanctity of contracts and to the norm of payment, and the few existing studies of European debtors suggest
they feel quite guilty about their inability to fulfill their obligations. See, e.g., L'OBSERVATOIRE DU CRIDIT ET
DE L'ENDETTEMENT, 10 ANS D'OBSERVATOIRE 32-33 (2004), available at http://www.observatoirecredit.be/SiteOce/site.nsf/a9ee787768a96ef2c 12569a7004bc215/56c2f0c718aa7806c I 256f54002ade3b/$FILE/
BrochureFR.pdf. Of course, the debate rages about whether the "stigma" of financial failure has died in the
United States. Without getting drawn into that great debate, suffice it to say the general sense undoubtedly
remains that one should pay one's obligations whether one feels bad or not when one is ultimately unable to do
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other laudable goals. Thus, for example, although the U.S. system seeks quite
reasonably to protect debtors from the accidents of life (unemployment,
divorce, medical problems), to avoid an undue burden on the social welfare
system and to preserve the incentive for debtors to work and add value to
society, many are likely to view this system as "unfair" if it makes no demand
on debtors to abide by the "norm."
A system that makes reasonable demands on overextended debtors to
attempt to abide by the norm of paying debts should be met with, if not
enthusiasm, at least acceptance. Even such debtor-friendly and creditorantagonistic groups such as the former German Communist Party have argued
96
in favor of multi-year payment plans as part of a consumer debt relief system.
Not only does a desire to avoid undermining "payment morality" underlie
European insistence on payment plans for all, but plans of reasonable duration
and demand likely represent the "fair" approach in the eyes of the great
majority of people-debtors and non-debtors alike.
But behavioral economics reveals one final danger of the bounds of selfinterest: people are willing "irrationally" to sacrifice their own self-interest and
welfare not only to help others who act fairly, but also to punish those who
they believe are not acting fairly. 97 In a simple but telling experiment called
the "Ultimatum Game," two players who neither know nor see each other are
instructed to split a sum of money. 98 The first player must make an offer, and
the second has only two options: (1) accept the offer, in which case both
players take home their share of the money, or (2) reject the offer, in which
case both players take nothing.99 The consistent outcome of this game is both
surprising and contrary to traditional economic "self-maximizing" predictions:

See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 10, at 289.
See, e.g., Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Revenge and Retalation, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 141, 143-44 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); Hanson & Kysar,
supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1489-97 (theory at 1494), 1511-13; Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at 1755.
98 See, e.g., Fon & Parisi, supra note 97, at 143-44; Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al.,
supra note 26, at 1489-97, 1511-13; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at
1755.
99 See, e.g., Fon & Parisi, supra note 97, at 143-44; Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al.,
supra note 26, at 1489-97, 1511-13; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at
1755.
96
97
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almost all subjects divide the money so as to give the first player no more than
60% and the second no less than 40%.' ° °
More surprising yet, the vast majority of second players reject the offerand give up a free benefit for themselves-if the first player offers less than
30%.1° 1 This tendency of the second players to sacrifice their own selfish
interest in obtaining a cost-free benefit simply to "punish" the first players'
greed or stinginess-essentially, their "unfaimess"-suggests something
important about the operation of a payment-plan system. On the one hand,
debtors are likely to accept a plan process that requires a fairly equal
distribution of benefits and burdens, gains and costs among debtors and
creditors. On the other hand, though, debtors-and those on the verge of
becoming debtors-are likely to sacrifice their own self-interest in achieving a
benefit if they view creditors or system administrators as "overreaching" or
acting unfairly in the plan process.
Unlike the cognitive biases discussed earlier, the results of the Ultimatum
Game might well differ for European players-at least for players from some
European cultures. The results in U.S. experiments may not reveal a universal
rejection of imbalance, but rather an aggressively "individual rights-oriented"
mentality unique to residents of the United States. My sense is that this is not
so. I believe, and recent scholarship suggests, ° 2 the Ultimatum Game would
play out very similarly with subjects from most parts of Europe, at the very
least northern Europe.
To the extent that the implications of the Ultimatum Game do apply to
consumer behavior in Europe, some of the European approaches seem more
likely than others to achieve positive results in light of debtors' "bounded selfinterest." Whatever the economic or social reasons supporting a particular
consumer debt relief provision, behavioral economics offers a revealing
perspective to consider in evaluating the effectiveness of a given approach. I
submit that the level of required sacrifice for the promised benefit, the length

1o0

See, e.g., Fon & Parisi, supra note 97, at 143-44; Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al.,

supra note 26, at 1489-97, 1511-13; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at
1755.
101 See, e.g., Fon & Parisi, supra note 97, at 143-44; Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 680-82; Jolls et al.,
supra note 26, at 1489-97, 1511-13; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, at 1135-38; Ulen, supra note 32, at
1755.
102 See Fon & Parisi, supra note 97, at 143-44 (suggesting a universally shared, deeply rooted "innate
sense of fairness" and tendency toward "negative reciprocity" in policing and punishing violations of social
fairness norms).
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of waiting time for that benefit, and the consistency of sacrifices and rewards
among debtors in different districts all impact the "fairness," and consequently
the debtor-educational potential, of a debt relief system.
A. The Danger of Mismatching Benefits and Burdens: "Unfair" Sacrifices
European legislators have agonized over how best to chart the line between
the Scylla of "de-responsible-izing" 0 3 debtors with "easy" relief and the
Charybdis of demanding too much sacrifice and thereby dooming payment
plans to fail. The Ultimatum Game suggests one more potential danger of
plans debtors perceive as mismatching benefits and burdens; payment-plan
laws that make demands debtors might view as overreaching and "unfair"
might well lead debtors to sacrifice their self-interest in obtaining debt relief.104
Instead of accepting the message of payment morality and engaging the
system, debtors and non-debtors alike might seek to "punish" creditors whom
they view as unduly advantaged at the expense of consumers in the system.
Such laws may well leave debtors and non-debtors with a sour taste for credit
and a vengeful attitude toward creditors, undermining the positive educational
potential of the payment-plan approach.
Paying one's debts may well be "the norm," but maintaining a modest but
"dignified" lifestyle is certainly also the norm. This is probably particularly
true in the states of Continental Europe, which take a much more active role in
guaranteeing a minimal level of social support for their citizens. 10 5 The
Ultimatum Game suggests people have a deeply ingrained sense of the
importance of fairness in balancing benefits and burdens. 1°6 Even if a system
offers discharge of debt or other effective relief, if it demands debtors divert so
much of their income to creditors that they are left worrying about how basic
needs will be met (housing, food, health care), consumers are likely to view
such a system as imbalanced, abnormal, and unfair. Debtors might sacrifice
103

1 use this odd English non-word because this is the French word (diresponsabilisation) that so

accurately describes the undesirable potential effect on consumers of making debt relief too available and too
easy. Europeans widely fear this effect, and the French word appears over and over in the legislative history of
the laws in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. See supra note 10 (collecting sources on the legislative history
of these laws).
104 See supra notes 97-101.
105 The meaning of a "dignified" life is obviously vague, but this norm is memorialized, for example, in
article 23 of the Belgian Constitution: "Everyone has the right to lead a life in conformity with human
dignity." CONST. art. 23. The laws in Belgium and Luxembourg incorporate this norm by requiring that
payment plans allow the debtor and her family to lead a life "in conformity with human dignity." See CODE
JUDICIAIRE/GERECHTELIJK WETBOEK art. 1675/3 [hereinafter CJ/GW]; Law of 8 Dec. 2001, art. 1.
1o6 See supra notes 97-101.
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their own benefit by opting to transfer or destroy assets or go underground
rather than engaging in an "unfair" bankruptcy system that demands too much
sacrifice for an eventual benefit of some form of relief from debt. Ultimately,
if consumers (both debtors and non-debtors) view the system as unfair and thus
not worthy of respect, this jeopardizes whatever potential the system might
have for inculcating positive lessons about responsible use of credit.
Among Continental European consumer bankruptcy systems, recent years
have witnessed a general progression away from pressing debtors to satisfy
creditor demands and toward requiring more moderate sacrifices by debtors
and offering them greater relief in return. 1°7 The "bounded self-interest"
revelation of behavioral economics suggests this evolution toward balancing
sacrifices and rewards will improve these systems' potential to achieve their
goals of social education. To be sure, these developments doubtlessly occurred
for other reasons-to ensure debtors could successfully complete the plans and
receive needed relief. But once again, behavioral economics offers one more
reason to applaud some developments and to challenge others.
1. Germany

The German system is a prime example of one that has evolved in ways
behavioral economics predicts will enhance consumers' view of the system as
"fair" and successful.
When the German legislature adopted its new
lnsolvenzordnung in 1994 (in force only since 1999), it offered complete
discharge of unpaid debts, but it imposed weighty demands on consumer
debtors. 1°8 Debtors had to cede to creditors 100% of their nonexempt income°9
for four years, and between 80% and 90% for three additional years.'
Income exemption levels at this time were relatively modest, leaving an
absolute maximum of, for example, only about $16,500 per year to a childless
couple. 11° Sensitive to the criticisms of debt counselors and other debtor
advocates, the German parliament responded to enhance the system beginning
in 2002. 11 It increased the income exemption levels for the vast majority of
German households by 50%, and it instituted biannual indexing to ensure that
these levels would keep pace with rising costs of living. 1 2 Consciously or
107 See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
108 See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 10, at 283-84.
'09 See id.
"10 See id. at 267-68.
"' See id. at 285-86.
112 See id.
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unconsciously, the German parliament has crafted an approach to consumer
overindebtedness that carefully balances relief with reasonable and "fair"
demands for debtor responsibility. This should maximize the potential for
positive attitudes from debtors and consumers generally, and consequently, the
educational potential of the system as a whole.
2. France

The French system has also evolved toward offering more valuable benefits
to debtors and making more "reasonable" demands for that relief. Change has
arrived more slowly and less powerfully in France, however, than in Germany.
In 1989, France launched the second consumer debt-relief system on the
European continent." 3 It started out quite hesitantly, focusing simply on
encouraging negotiated plans among creditors and debtors, and very seldom
did such plans offer any discharge of debt. 14 Only in 1999 were French courts
empowered to impose a discharge of any portion of the debtor's unpaid
obligations at the conclusion of a payment plan. 115 Even since then, the French
courts have applied this "ultimate" relief very sparingly," 6 more often
requiring debtors to pay all of their debts through long-term payment plans that
leave debtors at a very low standard of living. Since February 2004, a small
subset of the most financially troubled French consumers can receive an almost
immediate and total discharge of debt, however, courts have remained reticent
to offer such relief.'

17

In the early years of the new French system, many negotiated plans left8
debtors with less than $2300 per year per person in the debtors' households.'1
Many sources have predicted a majority of these early French payment plans
are doomed to failure. 1 9 Beginning in 1999, however, the legislature
addressed the problem of this miserly system by requiring that all plans leave
to debtors at least that part of their income the law exempts from seizure (as in
113 See Kilborn, French Law, supra note 10, at 621.
114 Like the other European systems, the French system strongly favored (and still favors) consensual
plans negotiated with creditors. See id. at 639-40. Because these negotiations are inherently unpredictable, I
focus on court-imposed measures of relief. I must admit, however, that negotiated plans represent an
extremely important part of the French system, currently disposing of around 70% of all cases. See id. at 640.
Whether the debtors will manage to complete these negotiated plans is an open-and hotly disputedquestion. See id. at 640-45, 662-63.
1' Seeid. at648-51.
116 Seeid. at654.
117 See id. at 655-60.
l
See id. at 642.
119 See id. at 640, 662-63.
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the German system). 12 A review of French plans in 2001 nonetheless revealed
that 65% of plans left debtors between $8400 and $16,800 per year, and only
3% left debtors with more than this.121
At least in the early years, and perhaps even now, it seems the French
approach to consumer overindebtedness potentially asks too much of debtors
and offers too little in return. As a result, consumers might well view this
system as not offering a "fair" division of value to debtors and creditors. The
balance of rewards and sacrifices in the French system does not bode well for
inculcating a sense of fairness among debtors and consumers observing the
system from the outside. This may undermine the educational value of the
French system and ultimately reduce its effectiveness in both treating and
curing overindebtedness in France.
3. Belgium
The Belgian system, among the very newest, has the potential to move
even further from a "fair" allocation of benefits and burdens. In force since
January 1999, the Belgian consumer debt relief law encourages out-of-court
agreement to a plan formulated by a "debt-mediator" chosen by the debtor, but
it vests wide discretion in the court to impose a plan in case of failure to reach
such agreement. 122 Like the original French law, the Belgian law resists
offering a discharge and allowing debtors to escape their debts. It readily
allows the court to impose a plan discharging debts for penalties and fees, but
not for basic principal or interest. 123 The proponents of the law clarified that a
plan without a discharge of principal would be the norm. 12 4 Only under
extraordinary circumstances may the court proceed to consider a discharge25 of
principal, and even then the law as written allows only a partialdischarge.'
Of course, a reduced potential benefit would not cause potential "fairness"
concerns if the demands made of the debtor were limited, but they are not. The
Belgian law appears somewhat ambivalent about moderating the demands on

120
121
122
123
124
125

See id. at 644.
See id. at 644-45.
See CJ/GW, supra note 105, arts. 1675/10 to 1675/13.
See id. art. 1675/12 § 1(4).
See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1,44 (1996-1997).
See CJ/GW art. 1675/13 § 1. The Belgian constitutional court held in 2003 limiting relief to a "partial"

discharge was unconstitutional under certain circumstances, so in reality, a full discharge is apparently now
available.
See Order No. 38/2003 (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.arbitrage.be/public/
f/2003/2003-038f.pdf.
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debtors. On one hand, the law directs the mediator to develop a plan that will
allow for maximum payment of debt while preserving for the debtor's family
"a life in conformity with human dignity." 1 On the other hand, if the matter
has to go before the court, the law in two separate places reminds the judge she
can demand the debtor make payments even from exempt income 127-a source
the German law and even the French law now hold inviolate. Of course, such
extreme demands must be "specially motivated," and the law reminds the
judge the debtor should, in any event, be left with at least the legally
guaranteed "existence minimum."' 28 The law presently guarantees only about
£2450 per year to singles living alone and about £9950 per year to most other
debtors including all married couples, regardless of the number of children in
their households. 129 Thus, Belgian law creates the same potential for trouble as
the pre-1999 French law.' 30 Demanding that debtors live at the poverty line to
receive at most a partial discharge benefit seems like an "unfair" offer that any
player of the Ultimatum Game might well reject. 13'
B. Hyperbolic Discounting and the Impact of Plan Duration
Hyperbolic discounting suggests longer plans are not necessarily more
effective than shorter ones at deterring excessive borrowing. Behavioral
research suggests a "priority of the present," which mean debtors will most
likely view a five-year plan as only about twice as onerous as a one-year
plan,' 32 as the later months of a term are hyperbolically discounted. Not only
are longer plans not necessarily more effective, behavioral economics suggests
they may be even less effective if "fairness" and consumer acceptance are
important goals.
Hyperbolic discounting exacerbates the "unfairness" effect of overly
demanding payment plans. While debtors weigh the very real and immediate
costs of a period of deprivation and subsistence living, they are likely to
126
127
128
129

See CJ/GW, supra note 105, arts.
See CJ/GW, supra note 105, arts.
See CJ/GW, supra note 105, arts.
See Law of 26 May 2002, art. 15,

1675/10 § 2 & 1675/3.
1675/12 § 4 & 1675/13 § 5.
1675/12 § 4 & 1675/13 § 5.
M.B. 31 July 2002, 33610, 33613; Royal Order of 3 Sept. 2004, arts.

1-2, M.B. 27 Sept. 2004, 69308, 69309.
130 In fact, this "potential trouble" has evidently not materialized.

One prominent study indicated that
judicial plans offering a discharge outnumbered those without a discharge by three to one, and the budgets
allocated to debtors in most plans seem quite reasonable. Kilbom, Belgium & Luxembourg, supra note 10, at
39.
131 See supra notes 97-101.
132 See Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1540 (using the five-year and one-year example in terms of the
deterrent effect of prison sentences).
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discount the benefit of a discharge more and more as its benefits are placed
farther and farther away in the future. 33 The future benefits of debt relief are
likely to be overwhelmed by the perceived burdens of spending even a
moderately long time living at a subsistence level. When this happens,
consumers are more likely to sense the system is "unfair. ' 34 The Ultimatum
Game predicts consumers may then act in a way that harms both themselves
and their creditors,' 35 for example, by rejecting the benefits of the system by
hiding in the underground economy or by manipulating the system through
false statements about assets or income. Once again, of central importance to
European policymakers, consumer perceptions of "unfairness" undermine the
potential for positive interaction with the system and inculcation of financial
and social responsibility.
1. Germany

The German system has incorporated elements from the beginning that
(probably inadvertently) reduce the effects of hyperbolic discounting. Recent
revisions have furthered that effort. The German system originally delayed
relief until after debtors had turned over most nonexempt income for seven
years. 136 Indeed, given the duration of the several preceding stages of the
German proceedings,
debtors had to wait for relief for up to eleven years in
37
some instances.'
From the beginning, the German parliament was quite conscious of the
need to enhance debtors' flagging motivation to reach a distant benefit. It
therefore instituted so-called "motivation rebates" in the years preceding the
final discharge benefit offering debtors "rebates" of 10% of their nonexempt
income at the end of the fourth year, 15% at the end of the fifth year, and 20%
at the end of the sixth year.' 38 Quite insightfully, these "motivation rebates"
offset the hyperbolic discount that debtors would apply to the seventh year
delayed benefit. 139
In addition, in 2001 the German parliament ultimately acceded to demands
to reduce the total delay between filing and relief. As of January 2002,
133 See
134 See
135 See
136 See
137 See
138 See
139 See

supra Part I.C.
supra notes 97-101.
supra notes 97-101.
Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 10, at 285.
id.
id. at 283-84.
supra Part I.C.
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German debtors are forced to wait (and to cede nonexempt income) for only
six years, and that period begins at an earlier stage to avoid a longer wait. 40 It
is impossible to gauge the psychological effects of these motivation rebates or
the reduction of the payment plan period, but these are further aspects of the
German system that seem to respond positively to pitfalls identified by the
insights of behavioral economics (again, most likely without explicitly taking
into account behavioral economics).
2. France
Once again, the French system seems to be evolving hesitantly in a
direction consistent with behavioral economics. A recent limitation on the
length of out-of-court plans-the cornerstone of the French system and the end
result of approximately 70% of all cases 14'-appears to address the problem of
hyperbolic discounting. This revision does not, however, address the "real"
problem. Before February 2004, out-of-court plans sometimes stretched
fifteen years into the future.142 Now, out-of-court plans are limited to ten years
in duration.143 Even ten years is an extremely long time, leading to an
extremely powerful potential for hyperbolic discounting. The problem with
these plans is not hyperbolic discounting of a delayed benefit. Few of these
plans offer a discharge at the end of the plan, but rather include immediate
benefits of simple payment extensions and interest rate reductions. 144 The
problem with out-of-court plans is not necessarily length, but paltry benefits.
The French legislature has moved in the opposite direction with respect to
court-imposed plans, theoretically exacerbating the hyperbolic discounting
problem. Originally, a court-imposed plan could not exceed five years in
duration, but that limit rose to eight years in 1999, and as of 2004, court145
imposed plans are subject to the same ten-year limit as out-of-court plans.
Here again, hyperbolic discounting is not the major concern. Like out-of-court
plans, court-imposed plans do not delay a substantial benefit because they
46
cannot forcibly discharge most debts. 1
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 10, at 284-85.
Kilbom, FrenchLaw, supra note 10, at 640 & n.150.
Seeid. at641.
See id. at 641-42; C. coM. art. L.331-6.
See Kilborn, French Law, supra note 10, at 641 & n.154.
See C. COM. art. L.331-7.
Court-imposed plans can discharge an unsecured deficiency remaining after forced sale of a mortgaged

home, but only this type of debt can be discharged, see id., and I have found no evidence of the frequency of
this type of relief.
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For the most economically troubled debtors, the two most recently
developed procedures in the French system offer quick and effective relief,
although such relief thus far has been practically available to few debtors.
French debtors can obtain a discharge of debt if one of the "commissions" that
administer the system makes one of two recommendations. First, since 1999,
the commission can recommend the "extraordinary" measure of a global delay
of payments of up to two years, followed by a reexamination of the debtor's
147
situation and possibly an imposed partial discharge of any remaining debt.
Alternatively, since February 2004, the commission can recommend a U.S.style "personal recovery" procedure, which discharges all unpaid debts upon
liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt assets, if any, after only a few months
and requires no dedication of the debtor's future income to creditors. 148 These
innovations seem to overcome the problem of hyperbolic discounting quite
powerfully, bringing the future benefit of discharge quite close to the filing
decision and calling for very little immediate countervailing burden on the
debtor.
The commissions seem to be recommending such timely relief in more and
more cases. From 2001 to 2004, the proportion of cases in which the
commissions recommended "extraordinary" global payment delays rose from
about 10% to about 13%. 149 Over the same period, the percentage of these
cases in which the commission ultimately recommended discharge of debt rose
from about 18% to about 30%. 150 Moreover, in the first several months of
availability of the new "personal recovery" procedure, the commissions have
diverted about 14% of all administered cases to that new process. 151 The
French system seems to be moving in the "right" direction to overcome
hyperbolic discounting, albeit at a carefully moderated pace.
3. Benelux

The newest consumer debt relief laws on the European continent minimize
the negative effects of hyperbolic discounting more effectively. Under
Luxembourg's new law on collective consumer debt regulation, in force since
October 2001, court-imposed payment plans cannot exceed seven years,

147
148
149
"o

See C. COM. art. L.331-7-1.
See C. COM. arts. 332-5 to 332-12; Kilbom, French Law, supra note 10, at 655-61.
Kilbom, French Law, supra note 10, at 654.
See id.

151See id. at 660.
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though in practice many plans are concluding in three or fewer years.' 52 The
Belgian and Dutch laws also offer only mildly delayed gratification. Belgian
plans can delay relief for debtors for only three to five years-down from a
maximum of seven years in the early draft law. 153 In the Netherlands, a long
tradition of voluntary plans had established three years as the standard period
for payment demands and delayed relief for consumers. 154 Now, the new
Dutch Wet schuldsaneringnatuurlijkepersonen (Law of Debt Rehabilitation of

Natural Persons), codified in the Bankruptcy Act and in force since December
155
1998, extends that tradition by limiting court-imposed plans to three years.
The recent trend in Europe seems to be reducing the length of payment plans.
Behavioral economics lends one more argument to support this trend: reducing
the effects of hyperbolic discounting maximizes the educational potential of a
shorter but more meaningful period of ceded income.
C. Local Legal Culture Fosters Feelings of "Unfairness"

If the demands of payment plans from area to area fluctuate widely,
individuals are likely to resist such "unfair" variations in treatment. In the
democratic societies of the United States and Europe, equal treatment for all is
the "norm" against which consumers will undoubtedly measure "fairness."
Even if different debtors receive slightly different treatment, if an objective
standard applies to all, debtors are more likely to feel that their experience with
the system was "fair." If the demands of plans vary from district to district
based apparently on nothing more than geography, debtors and non-debtors
alike are likely to view the system as "unfair." This again is likely to produce
consumer antagonism, loss of respect, and a conclusion that the system
156
represents an untrustworthy source of education and social guidance.
Unfortunately, most of the European systems seem to be falling into this trap
of excessive "discretion" and unequal treatment of debtors. 157

152 See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, M~morial A, p. 2972, art. 14; Kilbom, Belgium & Luxembourg, supra note
10, at 42.
153 Compare CJ/GW, supra note 105, arts. 1675/12 § 2 & 1675/13 § 2 with Doc. parl. Chambre (19961997) no. 1073/1, 42, 46.
154 See, e.g., Nick Huls et al., Can Voluntary Debt Settlement and Consumer Bankruptcy Coexist? The
Development of Dutch Insolvency Law, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 303, 304
(Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et al. eds., 2003).
"' See id. at 305.
156 See supra notes 97-101.
157 Other scholars have already observed and warned about the dangers of this trend in Europe. See, e.g.,
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fearof Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 25 (1998).
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1. Germany
Once again, the German system stands as a model of "fairness." It
equalizes treatment of debtors and avoids substantial disparities among
districts.
In Germany, every debtor is called upon to make the same
predictable sacrifice-turning over six years of nonexempt income, with
rebates of portions of that income after the fourth and fifth years."' The
calculation of each debtor's contribution is based on an objective, universally
known scale of exempt income.' 59 While this scale demands slightly less of
low-income debtors than higher-income debtors, at least the effect is uniform
across the country. 160 The German system leaves very little discretion in the
hands of local authorities to alter the balance of costs and benefits each debtor
can expect. 161 At least in terms of consistency across cases, the German
system seems most likely to earn a consumer evaluation of "fair" and a
reputation as a legitimate source of social education.
2. France
Wide variations in treatment of debtors from district to district plague the
French system. Broad discretion marks the French system from beginning to
end, despite recent efforts to set uniform boundaries. 62 The commissions are
in charge of drafting and negotiating payment plans, and local political
functionaries comprise a majority of each commission. 163 This understandably
leads to differences of opinion and approach, and to wide variances across
districts. First, despite imposition in 1999 of a minimum "floor" of exempt
income that must be left to debtors, the budgets that commissions and courts
impose on debtors in payment plans continue to vary widely. 164 Second,
commissions differ sharply in their willingness to propose effective measures
165
of
reliefdischarge,
in these plans.
to the
"extraordinary"
relief of
partial
as well as Similarly,
to a total access
discharge
through
the new process
of

158 See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 10, at 283-84.
159 See id. at 266-68, 285-86.
'60 See id.
161 Even the German system allows some discretion, as creditors can request denial of the debtor's
discharge if the debtor has made "insufficient" efforts to find and hold gainful employment during the six-year
plan period. See id. at 290-91. 1 have found no evidence that such creditor challenges are common, so the
potential for variances across districts does not seem to have materialized in any event. See id.
162 See Kilbom, French Law, supra note 10, at 642-45,663-64.
163 See id. at 636-39.
164 See id. at 644-45.
165 See id. at 664 & n.335.
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"personal recovery," is available only on the commissions' discretionary
recommendation. 166 These recommendations depend on vague standards; for
example, the debtor's financial situation qualifies as "irremediably
compromised."' 167 With no centralized control over these standards, differing
approaches in different geographical areas are inevitable. Although the French
legislature has made inroads into the broad discretion of system administrators,
it seems inevitable that lingering inequalities will result in a feeling of
unfairness among debtors and non-debtor observers. This threatens to rob the
French system of legitimacy and educational impact.
3. Belgium and the United States
The newest and the oldest players in the consumer bankruptcy arena appear
to be among the worst offenders in terms of the consistency element of
"fairness."
Wide discretion creates the potential for serious "local legal
culture" problems in the new Belgian system, as it does in chapter 13 practice
in the United States.
For the approximately one-third of all consumer bankruptcy cases filed
under chapter 13 in the United States, the law vests broad discretion in the
bankruptcy court to reject "wage-earner" payment plans that propose
"insufficient" payments to creditors. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires
chapter 13 debtors to propose a payment plan in "good faith" and to devote all
of their "disposable income" to creditors for three to five years.' 68 Courts in
different districts-sometimes within the same state-have seized on the
inherent ambiguity in these standards to impose widely varying requirements
for "good faith" proposals and measures of "disposable" income.,
United
States scholars have clearly identified and critiqued the problem of "local legal
culture" that these and other provisions produce among U.S. bankruptcy
courts. 170

Similarly, the new Belgian system creates inevitable local variations. It
vests the debt-mediators and courts with broad discretion to assign to debtors
166 See id. at 651-52, 658, 664 & n.335.
167 See C. coM. art. L.331-3.
168 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), (b)(1)(B) (2000).
169 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 501, 532, 546-47, 550-51 (1993) (noting the bankruptcy court in San Antonio, Texas, requires
100% payment, in Cincinnati, Ohio, 70%, in Austin, Texas, 25-33%, and in Dayton, Ohio, 10%).
170 Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistenceof Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidencefrom the
FederalBankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994).
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varying levels of sacrifice and varying amounts of relief. A court-imposed
plan may contain a wide variety of measures, up to and including partial
discharge of debt. 7 1 But whether and to what extent such relief is offered is
purely a matter of the unfettered discretion of the court. 172 Moreover, given
the lack of guidelines, courts are free to demand greater or lesser payments
from debtors.' 73 The law seems to suggest debtors generally be left with all of
their exempt income, but certain judges might decide by "specially motivated"
decisions to cut deeper into debtors' financial lives, so long as debtors retain
the meager minimum existence guaranteed by law. 174 Some courts are likely
to be more "specially motivated" to demand more from debtors than other
courts. Discretionary systems like the new Belgian one are apt to rate low on
the "fairness" scale, and the payment demands they impose are therefore apt to
lose their moral imperative.
CONCLUSION

Behavioral science has revealed systematic and persistent psychological
biases and mental shortcuts that consumers use in making welfare-jeopardizing
decisions and predictions about borrowing.175 Behavioral economic analysis
of the dangerous new world of consumer credit can therefore help us to be
more sensitive to and understanding of the plight of today's consumer. The
consumer is psychologically overwhelmed and perhaps overpowered by the
lure of buying now and paying later. If these forces cannot be controlled or
counteracted, as behavioral economics suggests, 176 perhaps consumer
bankruptcy systems can only offer effective relief as opposed to effective
treatment of the problem of overindebtedness.
If social education and the inculcation of payment morality are important
goals of the consumer insolvency system, behavioral economics further
suggests payment plans might achieve these results, but certain tactics will
jeopardize educational potential by souring debtors and perhaps others against
systems perceived as "unfair."' 177 The behavioral economics perspective is
certainly not "dispositive" of any question, but it does offer another compelling
171 See CJ/GW,supra note 105, arts. 1675/12 & 1675/13.
172 See id.
171 See id.
174 See supra Part IV.A.3.
175 See supra Part I.
176 See supra Part 11.
177 See supra Parts III-IV.A.

HeinOnline -- 22 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 44 2005-2006

20051

SEARCHING FOR CAUSES AND EVALUATING SOLUTIONS

vantage point from which to evaluate different efforts to enhance the
educational value of one system or another. Given the returns to creditors in
these systems (generally little or nothing), 178 it appears as though education is
the most plausible goal of consumer
bankruptcy, and European lawmakers
79
seem to be focused on that goal.1
Neither legislative history nor subsequent commentary contains any
evidence that any legislature has considered or is even aware of the behavioral
economics implications of any chosen approach to consumer debt relief. But
for what it might be worth, behavioral economics supports developments in,
for example, the German system, while challenging the effectiveness of other
European systems in achieving their goals of social education and inculcating
payment morality.'i 8 I do not wish to overstate the ability of behavioral
economics to identify the "best" system. But I do propose behavioral
economics offers one useful, neutral perspective from which to judge and
compare these systems.' 81

178
179
180
181

See, e.g. Niemi-Kiesiliiinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison, supra note 10, at 501.
See, e.g., id. at 498.
See supra Part IV.
On the role of economic analysis of law as an external baseline from which to evaluate comparative
approaches to law, see UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); Catherine A. Rogers,
Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 151, 153,
157-58, 163, 190 (1998).
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